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46 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
TAX FREE INCOME: COMPENSATION IN
KIND AND QUASI-IN-KIND*
EMERIC FISCHER* *
For purposes of the present discussion three assump-
tions must be accepted:
1. Taxation of income is more conducive to an equitable
apportionment of the tax burden than other forms of tax-
ation,
2. Progressive taxation is the only equitable form of
income taxation,
3. Broadly speaking, income taxation is an instrument
of economic control, a means of reducing economic imbal-
ance and economic inequality.
Acceptance of these assumptions do not however solve the
problem of determining what is income, or more restrictive-
ly, what is, or ought to be, taxable income.' Many attempts
have been made to formulate a definition of the word "in-
come", but it is almost an impossible task to delimit the
concept in its application to specific fields or problems. One
of the most comprehensive definitions, pertinent to the
limited subject herein discussed, is that of Professor Sim-
ons:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum
of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consump-
tion and (2) the change in the value of the store of
property rights between the beginning and end of the
period in question. In other words, it is merely the re-
* The term "Quasi-un-lind" is used in respect to property which
is non-cash at the time received or accrued, but is transformed
into cash at the time of realization.
•* Member of the Virginia Bar.
1 As indicated by the title, this paper is limited to an examination of
non-cash items of income, and no attempt will -be made to discuss
the income nature of gifts, inheritances, tax exempt interest, capi-
tal gains, social insurance -benefits, etc., etc.
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sult obtained by adding consumption during the period
to "wealth" at the end of the period and then substract-
ing "wealth" at the beginning. The sine qua non of
income is gain, . . -and gain to someone during a
specified time interval.2
Admittedly, use of this definition as the formula for the
tax base is legally and administratively not feasable. As a
matter of fact, the Internal Revenue Code and the Regula-
tions define gross,3 net,4 and taxable 5 income in great de-
tail, so as to include income from all possible sources and
thus maximize revenue to capacity. Yet, through statutory
exclusions, regulatory interpretations, administrative rul-
ings and court decisions the tax base has been constantly
eroded with the result that not only have sources of rev-
enue been diminished, but the equitable nature of progres-
sive taxation has been reduced and distorted. A specific
examination of the various eliminations from the tax base
follows.
Meats and Lodging
The value of meals furnished an employee is to be ex-
cluded from his gross income if they are furnished on the
business premises of the employer for the convenience of the
employer.0 Living quarters furnished an employee are also
to be excluded if, in addition to the two tests aforemen-
tioned, acceptance of such lodging is a condition of his
employment.7 Although section 119 was introduced into
the statute as recently as 1954, the question of taxability
of this form of "compensation" has been the subject of
rulings, regulations and court decisions for over 40 years.
An office decision 8 of 1919 stated that board and lodging
2 SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 61.
4 Referred to as "adjusted gross income", Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
section 62.
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 63.
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1054, section 119(1); Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1
(a) (1956).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 119(2); Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1(,b) (1956).
8 0,1). 265, 1 Cum. Bull. 71 (1919).
1964]
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furnished seamen in addition to their cash compensation is
considered as having been paid for the convenience of the
employer and is not taxable income to the employee. But
under prior law the question whether the meals or lodging
were paid as additional compensation was of crucial im-
portance 9 in determining their taxability. Regulation 118
provided:
If a person receives as compensation for services ren-
dered a salary and in addition thereto living quarters
or meals, the value to such person of the quarters and
meals so furnished constitutes income subject to tax. If,
however, living quarters or meals are furnished to em-
ployees for the convenience of the employer, the value
thereof need not be computed and added to the com-
pensation otherwise received by the employees. 10 (em-
phasis added)
Whereas under section 119 of the 1954 Code, the "conven-
ience of the employer" test is the primary test, under prior
determinations it was "simply an administrative test to be
applied only in cases in which the compensatory character
of such benefits is not otherwise determinable"." This
ruling has been confirmed by Tax Court decisions in (inter
alia) Joseph L. Doran,12 Charles A Brasher,13 Leslie
9 The new provisions of section 119 do away with this problem by
specifying that contractual provisions or state statutes are not to
be determinative of the question whether the meals and lodging
are intended as compensation. The question is one of fact and
intent in each instance.
10 Treas. Reg. 118, section 39.22(a)-3 (1953); Treas. Reg.111, section
29.22 (a)-3 (1943) ; Treas. Reg. 1103, section 19.22 (a) -3, as amend-
ed by T.D. 4965 (1940).
11 Mim. 6472, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 15, modifying Mim. 5023, 1940-1
Cum. Bull. 14 and Mim. 5657, 1944 Cum. Bull. 550, both of which
held that the "convenience of the employer" rule is applicable to
situations in which it was evident that living quarters or meals
are furnished to an employee as compensation.
12 21 T.C. 374 (1953), maintenance engineer of a state college with
a condition of employment that he occupy quarters on the grounds.
Since South Carolina statute considered rental allowance as part
of gross salary, court held that "convenience of employer rule" is
not applicable.
'3 22 T.C. 637 (1954), staff doctors of a state sanatorium whose
civil service rating and salary was determined by adding to a
base phy the value of meals and quarters furnished at the sana-
torium, which they were bound to take as a condition of employ-
ment. Held taxable as compensation.
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Dietz,14 and Herman J. Romer,15 in spite of the fact that in
the earlier Benaglic'6 case the opposite view was held. The
Second Circuit refused to accept the 1950 ruling 17 and in-
terpreted Treasury Regulation 111, § 29.22 Is in the light
of the interpretation placed upon it by the Treasury itself
(the convenience of the employer test) in rulings between
1919 and 1950, saying:
Treasury regulations and interpretations long con-
tinued without substantial change, applying to un-
amended or substantially reanacted statutes, are
deemed to have received congressional approval and
have the effect of law.19
However, in the area of cash allowances for meals and
lodgings, the compensation test is still important. The Com-
mittee Reports 20 as well -as the Regulations hold such al-
lowances includible in gross income to the extent that such
allowances constitute compensation.
Assuming that the "convenience of employer" test is
met, is it essential that the employee be under an express
requirement to accept the lodging furnished? The practical
and factual problems of the specific situation will be de-
14 25 T.C. 1,255 (1956), where occupancy of an apartment was the
sole consideration for janitorial services. In this case it was ob-
vious that it was compensation, rather than for convenience of
the employer.
15 28 T.C. 1228 (1957), hotel manager who was required "to live in
the hotel since his services were required on a 24 hour basis".
Held taxable compensation.
16 Arthur Benaglia, 36 B.T.A. 838 (1937).
17 Supra note 11.
18 Referring to the quoted material to which n. 10 supra applies.
19 Diamond v. Sturr, 221 F. 2d 264, 267 (?,d Cir. 1955) citing Helver-
ing v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79,83 (1938). The court cited the follow-
ing Treasury rulings applicable to the period 1919-1950: O.D.
265, 1 Gum. Bull. 71(1019); O.D. 814, 4 Cum. Bull. 1459 (1921);
O.D. 915, 4 Cum. Bull. 1634 (1921); I.T. 22M3, V-1 Cum. Bull.
32 (1926) I.T. 3420, 1940-2 Cum. Bull. 40; I.T. 2232, IV-2 Gum.
Bull. 144 (1925).
20 Senate Finance Committee Report No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
190 (1954).
21 Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1 (c) (2) (1956).
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terminative of this question. In Setal 22 miners were fur-
nished meals and lodging at the mining camp which was
located 67 miles from the nearest inhabited locality. Ac-
ceptance of meals and lodging was not an express require-
ment of employment, 'but without such facilities the em-
ployer could not have maintained an adequate labor force,
nor could the employees have performed their work. The
value of the accommodations was held to be excludable from
the miners' gross income. On the other hand, the rental
value of a company-owned home occupied by the controlling
stockholders 23 of a granite company was taxable income,
although the area lacked the normal residential public fa-
cilities, 24 since his duties did not require his livng n a com-
pany house.2 5
To what extent may the family of the employee enjoy
tax free income in the form of meals and lodging furnished
by the employer? Neither the statute nor the Regulations
indicate that any such accommodations would be tax free,
and Revenue Ruling 59-409 26 specifically provides that "the
value of the meals and lodging furnished the faculty mem-
bers' wives and children constitute additional compensa-
tion which is includible in the gross income of the faculty
members. '27 However, in 1960, this ruling was withdrawn,28
without explanatory remarks. Does this mean that under
special circumstances free meal and lodging privileges of
the. family of the employee are to be tax free? It would
appear to be an unreasonable extension of the exclusion
provided for in section 119.
Approaching section 119 from a technical point of view,
we are faced from the outset with a knotty question: What
22 -Manuel G. Setal, 20 T.C.M. 780 (1961).
23 All key employees were furnished rent-free company-owned homes.
24 "Mion is not a desirable place to live for anyone not connected with
either Winnsboro Granite or Rion Crush Stone Corporation"-
statement by the court in findings of fact.
25 Mary B. Heyward, 36 T.C. 739 (1961), affd per curiam, 801
F.2d 307 (4th Cir. 1962).
26 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 48.
27 Ibid. The daculty members of a boarding school were required to
accept meals and lodging as a condition of employment.
28 Rev. Rul. 348, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 41.
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is "convenience of the employer"? The Regulation 59 state
that it is a question "of fact to be determined by analysis
of all the facts and circumstances in each case". Ordinarily,
if meals are furnished during the working day or immedi-
ately before or after working hours, provided in the latter
case that it serves a business purpose of the employer other
than providing additional compensation, it will be con-
sidered as having met the test. But meals furnished on
non-working days, or at times when the employee's presence
on the employer's business premises does not serve a busi-
ness purpose of -the employer, do not qualify for the exclu-
sion. However, if the condition of employmiient requires
that the employee live on -the business premises of the em-
ployer, the exclusion applies to the value of any meals fur-
nished the employee even if acceptance of such meals is not
a condition of the employment.3 0 There is indication that
these conditions, which are complex enough as they now
stand, will become even more complicated if the proposed
regulations 31 will be finalized in their present form. Thus
under present regulations 3 2
A waitress who works from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. is fur-
nished without charge two meals a workday. In order
to insure that the waitress will commence work on
time, the employer encourages her to have her break-
fast on his business premises before starting work, al-
though she is not required to have her breakfast there.
She is required to have her lunch on such premises. The
waitress is permitted to exclude the value of these
meals from her gross income....
Under the proposed regulations 33 under the same circum-
stances
• . The waitress is not permitted to exclude from her
gross income the value of the breakfast but she can
exclude the value of the lunch.
29 Treas. Reg. section 1.1-19-1 (a) (2) (1956).
30 Ibid.
31 Proposed Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1, 27 Fed. Reg. 12836 (1962).
32 Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1(d) Example 1 (1956).
33 Supra note 31.
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On the other hand the proposed regulations do clarify
some of the murkier portions of the present regulations.
Section 1.119-1 (c) (2) 34 provides that the exclusion "ap-
plies only to meals and lodging furnished in kind, without
charge or cost to the employee," (notwithstanding the fact
that Code Section 119 says "value of any meals or lodging."
Emphasis added). Until 1959 it was therefore not clear
whether meals or lodging on premises of the employer (for
his convenience) furnished at a (nominal) cost to the em-
ployee would be includible in gross income. The Commis-
sioner 3 5 and the Tax Court in Boykin 36 held that it is. In
the Boykin case the court interpreted the last sentence 37 of
section 119 as referring to meals and lodging furnished
without charge! To bolster its argument, the court quoted
the following remarks of the Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee made in introducing this legisla-
tion:
Under present law, if an employer furnishes an em-
ployee meals or lodging, the employees may have to in-
clude their value in his income even though they are
furnished for the convenience of the employer if there
is any evidence that they were taken into account in
computing the amount of the employee's wages. The
new code will remove this inequity. Under the new
code, the employee will not be taxed on the value of his
meals or lodging if they are received at his place of
business, and he is required to accept them in connec-
tion with his job.
How the Tax Court interpreted these passages to read as it
construed them to read is rather mystifying. Its interpre-
tation retains the repudiated "compensation" test and
repudiates the Code "convenience for employer" test. Ap-
34 Treas. Reg. (1956).
35 In Rev. Rul. 545, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 50.
36 J. Melvin Boyldn, 29 TC. 813 (1958).
37 The sentence reads: "In. determining whether meals or lodging
are furnished for the convenience of the employer, the provisions
of an employment contract or of a State statute fixing terms of
employment shall not he determinative of whether the meals or
lodging are intended as compensation".
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parently, it could not break away from its pre-1954 Code
decisions. 38 The Eighth Circuit however was not willing to
be bound by shackles which were legislatively removed. It
reversed the Tax Court 39 and interpreted section 119 in
light of the "convenience of employer" rules. In effect the
court said that the obvious, natural and clear meaning of
the Code section is that "there is excluded from the gross
income of an employee the value of meals or lodging fur-
nished to him for the convenience of his employer whether
or not such meals or lodging are furnished as compensa-
tion. ..40 It also pointed out the the phrase in the regula-
tion on which the Commissioner relies 41 is inconsistent with
the regulation as a whole. The last sentences of paragraphs
(a) and (b) 42, and example (3) in paragraph (d) 43 state
that the exclusion shall apply irrespective of whether the
employment contract refers to the accommodations as
compensation. Apparently the logical reasoning of the court
convinced the Commissioner that he was in error. In Reve-
nue Ruling 59-307 44 the Commissioner announced that he
will follow Boykin in cases where the facts are similar. The
proposed regulations give effect to this decision 45 and give
examples of its application.46 Furthermore the proposed
regulations lay to rest the problems raised in situations
where the employer is required to furnish meals and lodg-
38 See notes 12, 13, 14, 15, supra.
39 Boykin v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 249 (8th Cir. 1958).
40 Id. at 253.
41 Quoted in text to which note 34 supra applies.
42 Of Treas. Reg. section 1.119 (1956).
43 Ibid.
44 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 48.
45 Proposed Treas. Reg. section 1.119-1 (a) (3), 27 Fed. Reg. 12836(1962).
46 Id. section 1.119-1(d) Example (4): A bank maintains a cafeteria
on its premises where its employees may obtain their noon meals.
The bank charges its employees for the meals an unvarying rate
per meal by subtracting such amount from their stated compen-
sation, regardless of whether they ate in the bank cafeteria. Em-
ployee A's duties require him to be available for consultation and
to answer inquiries during his lunch period. Employee B's duties
do not require him to be available during his lunch period. Neither
A nor B would include in gross income the amount so paid as part
of his compensation. A would not be required to include the value
of the meals he received for such flat charge in -his gross income,
but B would be required to include the value of the meals he re-
ceived in his gross income.
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ing to his employees not because of the normal convenience
of the employer reasons, but because the job site is so re-
mote that the work could not be performed without the
furnishing of these accommodations. 47 Query: is a com-
pany house furnished to an employee rent free in order to
provide facilities for entertaining customers? 48 Since sec-
tion 119 does not provide for apportionment 49 of the value
of accommodations provided to an employee for the conven-
ience of the employer, is all of this benefit tax free?
Section 119 applies to meals and lodging furnished to
employees. It is well established that partners and propri-
etors are not employees but owners. The Treasury's posi-
tion is that such accommodations furnished to a partner,
even though for the convenience of the employer, are not
deductible costs of the partnership business (and therefore
must be eliminated from the computation of its net income)
and the resulting increase in the partnership income must
be included in the recipient partner's gross income.50 In-
terestingly enough the Tax Court rejects this position and
47 See Manuel G. Setal, 20 T.C.M. 780 (1961); Wiliam J. Olkjer, 32
T.C. 464 (1959); George I. Stone, 32 T.C. 1021 (1959). Example
7 of the proposed regulations gives the situation of "a construc-
tion worker employed at a construction project at a remote job
site in Alaska. Due to the inaccessibility of facilities for the em-
ployees who are working at the job site to obtain food and lodg-
ing and the prevailing weather conditions, the employer is re-
quired to furnish meals and lodging to the employee at the camp
site in order to carry on the construction project. The employee
is required to pay $40 a week for the meals and lodging. The
weekly charge of $40 is not, as such, part of the compensation in-
cludible in the gross income of the employee, and . . . the value
of the meals and lodging is exeludible from his gross income."
48 It is assumed that the facility is used primarily for the further-
ance of the business and it is directly related to the active conduct
of such business. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 274.
49 But as to pre-1954 situation see Olin E. Ellis, 6 TC 138 (1946),
in which the rental value of the apartment of a realty conpora-
tion officer was apportioned into taxable and non-taxable parts:
He could exclude a portion equivalent to the rental value of the
apartment of the former night manager whose duties he had taken
over.
5o Rev. Rul. 80, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 62.
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has held in Papineau 51Y Doak 52, and Moran 53 that meals and
lodging furnished, not for his personal convenience but be-
cause the needs of the business required it, is excludible
from the gross income of a proprietor or partner, and is
deductible as a business expense of the business entity. The
Tax Court tenaciously adheres to its position even though
it has 'been reversed in three Circuits.54 These reversals
were bottomed on the principle that "[t]he expenses in-
curred by these taxpayers are expenses which everyone
must incur to live, regardless of business requirements, and
are, we think, personal and thus not deductible."5 5 The ob-
vious remedy (from the taxpayer's point of view) is to in-
corporate the business entity, thereby converting himself
from ownership status to "employee' status. Should the
deductibility of and inclusionary nature of an item depend
on the formalities of the relationship between the bestower
of and the enjoyer of the accommodation furnished?
Even though only a tiny fraction of the litigafed cases
have been referred to in the foregoing analysis, it is obvious
that the question of taxability of meals and lodging fur-
nished by an employer to an employee is a very compli-
51 1-6 T.C. 130 (1951). Petitioner, a partner and manager of a hotel,
lived and took his meals in the hotel. This arrangement was es-
sential in order to manage the hotel to the best advantage of the
partnership during all hours of the day and night. The court
said: "[i]t is at once apparent that if a partner is a proprietor
who cannot employ himself or compensate himself by a salary for
services rendered to himself, neither can he compensate himself
by furnishing himself meals and lodging. A sole proprietor can not
create income for himself by buying himself meals and providing
himself with lodging any more than he can lift himself by his own
boot straps." (Emphasis added).
52 24 T.C. 569 (1955). Relying on Papineau the court held that "[1]t
was there [in Papineau] said in that connection that "it is in ac-
cordance with sections 22 and 23 of the Internal Revenue Code[of 1939] that the expenses of operation be computed without
eliminating small portions of depreciation, cost of food, wages,
and general expenses to represent the cost of his meals and lodg-
ing . . ." (Emphasis added).
53 T.C.M. 1955-202. Substantially on all fours with Doak.
54 Commissioner v. Doak, 234 F.2d 704 (4th Cir. 1956); Commis-
sioner v. Moran, 236 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1956); U.S. v. Briggs,
238 F.2d 53 (10th Oir. 1956). After these decisions, it reviewed
this problem in Thomas Robinson, 31 T.C. 65 (1958) and decided
over six dissents to maintain its view.
55 Commissioner v. Doak, 284 F.2d 704, 708 (4th Cir. 1956).
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cated one. The factual circumstances of each case will be
determinative of the issue. The Revenue Service itself has
recognized this problem, and in its Revenue Procedure
62-32 56 announced that it "will not issue advanced rulings
or determination letters because of the inherently factual
nature of the problems involved."
Travel and Entertainment
For the group of employee-taxpayers who wish to maxi-
mize personal consumption tax free there is no more fertile
field to till than the acreage provided by section 162 57 which
permits him to partake in cost-free entertainment and
travel closely connected with his business activities. And
this is so notwithstanding new section 274 58 which does
limit such endeavors to activities directly related to the
active conduct of business. In other words the new section
does not set forth or fashion a new class of deductions but
merely tightens and augments the "ordinary and necessary"
requirements of Section 162. Therefore an analysis of the
decisions, rulings and regulations under pre-section 274 law
is still pertinent in an evaluation of the tax free benefits
obtainable under present law.
Although it is common knowledge that an expense 59 to
be deductible must be "ordinary and necessary," it would
not be superfluous to briefly review the interpretations
placed upon that phrase by the courts and the Commis-
sioner. In light of these interpretations, an examination of
the cases in which a deduction has been claimed for the
type of expenses under discussion would then be more
meaningful and perhaps more instructive in arriving at a
conclusion as to what limitations ought to be placed on such
deductions (resulting in tax-free enjoyment of consump-
56 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 527.
57 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
58 Ibid. (effective as of January 1, 1963).
59 In order to eliminate the necessity of constant reference to "ex-
penses incurred in a trade or business of the taxpayer", the word
"expense" is herein used in that context only, impliedly excluding
personal expenses and capital expenditures.
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tion). The classic "definition" was given by the Supreme
Court in Welch v. Helvering :60
We may assume that the payments were necessary ....
[The taxpayer] certainly thought they were, and we
should be slow to override his judgment. But the prob-
lem is not solved when the payments are characterized
as necessary .... There is need to determine whether
they are both necessary and ordinary .... ,Ordinary in
this context does not mean that the payments must be
habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer
will have to make them often. A lawsuit... may hap-
pen once in a lifetime. The counsel fees may be so heavy
that repetition is unlikely. None the less, the expense
is an ordinary one because we know from experience
that payments for such a purpose, ... , are the common
and accepted means of defense against attack .... The
situation is unique in the life of the individual affected,
but not in the life of the group, the community,, of which
he is a part.6 ' (Emphasis added).
The Tax Court 62 and the Commissioner 63 follow. this rule
that the expense must be both ordinary and necessary. The
word "necessary" has been held to mean "appropriate" and
"helpful" rather than necessarily essential to taxpayer's
business 6-. In an interesting "twist" the Second Circuit
held that an expense which is not an ordinary and necessary
nonbusiness expense may nevertheless be an ordinary and
necessary .business expense.6 5
60 290 UwS. 111 (1933).
61 Id at 113, 114. In Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (I40)
the ,Court, in reference to the once in a lifetime occurrence, said:
"Yet the transaction which gives rise to it must be of common
or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved.
62 Foye Lumber & Tie Company, 33 B.T.A. 271 (1935).
63 A.R.R. 444, 4 Cum. Bull. 159 (1921).
64 Blackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 255 (2d' Cir. 1934).
65 Commissioner v. Macy, 215 F.2d 875 (2d Cir., 1954). The case
involved a trustee who because of mismanagement (not involving
bad faith or dishonesty) had to pay surcharges to the benefici-
aries for losses incurred through his negligence. Full import to
the statement in Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1944)
that what "is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure questions
of fact in most instances" has thus been given effect in this deci-
sion.
1964]
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Neither the various Revenue Acts, nor the 1939 Code,
nor the 1954 Code specifically provide for deductibility of
entertainment expenses, but they are deductible if they
meet the ordinary and necessary tests. In Hal E. Roach
Studios 66 one half of the expense of maintenance and up-
keep, including depreciation, supplies, and wages of the
crew of a yacht were allowed. The boat was acquired sole-
ly for business purposes (production of marine pictures),
but during the year in litigation very few films were pro-
duced due to cancellation by the film distributor. To pre-
vent deterioration the vessel was used for considerable en-
tertainment. The boat was kept available at all times for
picture production. The court held that "though the evi-
dence was not precise on the relative costs incurred for
business and pleasure use, we are satisfied that at least
one-half of the expense was an ordinary and necessary ex-
pense of petitioner's business, and accordingly we allow
the sum of $8776.67 as a deduction." 67 In a more recent
case 68 the court was not willing to accept evidence which
was "not precise" and held that "the amounts deductible by
petitioner as ordinary and necessary expenses in the two
allowable categories of entertainment and cabin cruiser
expenses and depreciation are 25 per cent of those now
claimed by him." It is immediately apparent, even from
the two cases above cited, that the principal difficulties in
determining the deductibility of entertainment expenses is
in distinguishing between the personal and business
nature of the expenditures. Examples of flagrant claims
of personal expenditures as business expenses may
be found in Challenge Manufacturing Company 69 and
BB 20 B.T.A. 917 (1930).
67 Id. at 919. The deductibility or nondeductibility under new section
274 will be discussed infra.
68 Richard A. Sutter, 21 T.C. 170, 174 (1953).
69 37 T.C. 650 (1962). Taxpayer was a corporation owned wholly
by one stockholder. The corporation "owned" a luxury cabin
cruiser used by the stockholder for pleasure cruises and parties.
Some of the participants at a few of the activities were persons
who had some connection with the business of the taxpayer, but
their presence on board did not necessarily have any proximate
relationship to the business of the taxpayer. During the two
years in question the corporation took deductions totalling $56,000
in respect to expenses incurred in operating and maintaining the
[VOL,. 5:46
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American Properties, Inc.70 But in Rodgers Dairy Com-
pany 71 it was not obvious whether the exhibiting of show
horses was merely a hobby of its controlling stockholder or
a bona fide promotional activity. The evidence sufficiently
convinced the court that it was an ordinary and necessary
business expense. In the same case it was found that an
automobile owned by the corporation but used by the con-
trolling stockholder was operated for the conduct of the
business of the company even though there was a small
amount of nonbusiness use during two out of the three
years in contest. As to the third year, since the sharehold-
er could not prove that his personal use was inconsequen-
tial, an allocation was to be made between business and
nonbusiness use according to the Cohan 7 2 rule. The court
further found that liquor furnished for the entertainment
of suppliers of the company was an ordinary and necessary
business expense, especially in view* of the fact that the
amount ,involved was not large in relation to the purchases
of the company.73
cruiser. The Commissioner disallowed one half of the sum on the
grounds that that portion related to the personal use and enjoy-
ment of the sole stockholder. The Tax Court approved the dis-
allowance saying: "Indeed, we think that the Commissioner has
been exceedingly generous in allowing deductions for one-half the
depreciation and boat expenses paid by the corporation. Had he
allowed a considerably smaller deduction, we would have approv-
ed his determination on this record." (p. 659).
70 28 T.C. 1100 (1957). In this sole stockholder case the full deduc-
tion of expenses of operation and capitalization of the cost of a
race boat totalling $33,000 was disallowed to the corporation and
taxed as income to the stockholder. The facts showed that the
stockholder was a speed boat enthusiast who used the boat for
racing purposes, and used the corporation to give the activity the
appearance of a business transaction under the guise that there
might be profit in the designing, construction, and sale of racing
boats. The evidence clearly showed however, that he had no in-
tention of selling such boats, and in fact turned down a good price
offered by a prospective buyer for two boats similar to his (which
won the Gold Cup races). See also Greenspon v. Commissioner,
229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956) in which an industrial pipe corpora-
tion claimed deductions for expenditures on the farm-house of
its dominant stockholder allegedly used for promotional purposes
in the form of a horticultural show place.
71 14 T.C. 66 (1950).
72 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). In the prin-
ciple case the allocation was 90% business and 10% personal.
73 See also Johnson v. U.S., 45 F. Supp. 377, 380 (D.C. Cal. 1941)
in which country club dues and entertainment expenses were al-
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Section 62 (2) (A) 74 provides that an employee may
deduct from his gross income expenses paid or incurred by
him in connection with his employment if he is reimbursed
by his employer. Therefore an employer could furnish an
employee with facilities of entertainment (yacht, cars,
hunting lodge) in which the employee could entertain his
customers and then obtain a reimbursement for sums he
expended for their entertainment (food, drink, etc.). Al-
though reimbursement by an employer does not conclusive-
ly establish the business nature of the entertainment, it
does weigh in favor of that conclusion. A sole proprietor
would find it more difficult to prove the business purpose
of the entertainment activity than the reimbursed em-
ployee. By incorporating, he would attain the employee
status, and even if reimbursement were not feasable, writ-
ten evidence that the salary is established at a high enough
level to absorb such expenditures, would qualify them for
deduction (as if there had been reimbursement).75 In Wal-
ter E. Ditmars Th the Commissioner allowed all the reim-
bursed travel, meals and lodging while away from home
expenses (which would be allowable whether reimbursed
or not) of the president of a widely held corporation, but
disallowed that portion of the reimbursed expenses which
represented entertainment, club dues, club charges and
telephone expenditures. (The president devoted his full
working time to the business.) The evidence was clear that
all the travel, and a substantial portion of entertainment,
was connected with the business. The Tax Court, using the
Cohan 77 rule allocated the disallowed amounts between
business and personal expenditures, allowing a deduction
lowed in full, the court stating: "The Government demanded and
received large income taxes on the fees collected by the plain-
tiff's expenditure in club dues, and the Government cannot refuse
to allow plaintiff a deduction as a business expense of the money
which produced the business. To rule otherwise would revive the
fable of the goose and the golden eggs."
74 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
75 See Grover Tyler, 13 T.C. 186 (1949); Fred N. Fischer, 6 T.C.M.
520 (1947). Contra I.T. 3728, 1945, Cum. Bull. 78; Treas. Reg.
section 1.62-1(f) (1) (1957).
76 20 T.C.M. 495 (1961) rev'd on other grounds 302 F.2d 481 (2d
Cir. 1962).
77 Supra n. 72.
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for the former under Section 212 (1).78 Whereas hereto-
fore such deductions were allowed under section 162 (trade
or business of employer), this decision by recognizing de-
ductibility under section 212 may alter the test of what is
ordinary and necessary as regards employees' expenditures
for producing their income (i.e., their salaries).
The Code specifically provides for deductibility of trav-
eling expenses.7 9 The phrase "traveling expenses" applies
to transportation costs, including baggage transfer, taxis,
and porters, meals and lodging, telephone and telegraph,
tips, and other such expenditures. The travel must have
been undertaken in pursuit of business while away from
home overnight.8 0 The "away from home" requirement has
given cause to endless litigation. The Commissioner has
steadfastly maintained that "home" is the taxpayer's post
of duty and if he lives somewhere else the travel between
the two locations is nothing more than commuting and the
meals and lodging are also personal in nature.8' The Tax
78 Int. Rev. Code of 1954. Section 21Z(1) alows a deduction for all
ordinary and' necessary expenses paid or incurred for the produc-
tion or collection of income.
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 162 (a) (2).
80 The overnight requirement applies to deductibility of meals and
lodging only.
81 See, e.g. O.D. 1021, 5 Gure. Bull. 174 (1921); I.T. 1264, I-1 Cum.
Bull. 122 (1922), secretary of Congressman who maintains per-
manent residences elsewhere, but lives in Washington during ses-
sions of Congress; I.T. 3a14, 1939-2 Gum. Bull. 152, baseball play-
er whose club headquarters is in city other than his hometown;
but G.CIM. 23672, 1943 Cum. Bull, 66, distinguishes between full
time post of duty and temporary posrof duty: In connectiori with
wartime dollar a year men it stated that "if an individual con-
tinues in private employment at his original place of business and
renders only intermittent services to the Federal Government, his
"home", for Federal income tax purposes, continues to be his
original place of business, and any traveling expenses, including
the cost of meals and lodging, incurred in serving the Fed-
eral Government while away from such "home" will be deductible
as business expenses. ... If, however, an individual serving the
Federal Government has severed his connection with the private
organization which he previously served, or if he does not con-
tinue to render active service to the private organization with
which he is connected, it will be considered that his business loca-
tion, post, or station, and therefore, his "home", is at Washington
... with the result that amounts expended for meals and lodging
at such post of duty are not deductible .... ;" Rev. Rul. 497,
1954-2 Cum. Bull. 152; Rev. Rul. 147, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51; Rev.
Rul. 236, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 274; Rev. Rul. 604, 1955-2 Cum. Bull.
49; Rev. Rul. 49, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 152.
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Court also consistently expresses this same view.8 2 How-
ever the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,83 Sixth,84
and Fifth 85 do not agree with this interpretation. The
Supreme Court has not as yet expressed its opinion as to
what the statutory meaning is, although in two cases 86 it
would have had the opportunity to do so. It can be expect-
ed that litigation in this area will continue en masse until
a clearer and more contextual meaning will be developed re-
garding the situs of the "tax home" of a taxpayer. Litiga-
tion will also continue in respect to the question of the re-
quirement that meals and lodging can be deducted only if
the taxpayer was away from home overnight.87 However
since this paper is less concerned with the technicalities of
the problem than with the tax free benefits obtainable
under these provisions, it shall now turn to review some
exemplary cases where such benefits have been obtained.
82 The cases are too numerous to cite. One the latest is George
Riscalla, T.C.M. 1963-117, on appeal to 5th Cir.
8a Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (1960). The court said
that the Tax Court's application of the "indefinite" versus "tem-
porary" test to determine whether the job site is the employee's
"home" is too mechanical. The determination should be based on
the reasonable probability of long employment at the locus of thejob. The Commissioner, in Rev. Rul. 95, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 749,
announced that he will not follow this decision. In an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision (Wallace v. Commissioner, 114 F.2d 407
(1944) ) the court said that the Tax Court nvaded the domain
of Congress in construing the word "home" as the taxpayer's place
of business, employment, or post of duty, and that the word is to
be understood in its ordinary sense. The Tax Court refused to
follow this definition.
84 Burrus v. Gray, 287 F.2d 698 (1961).
85 Williams v. Patterson, 286 F.2d 333 (1961).
86 Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) and Flowers v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 465 (1946). In both cases the decision
was grounded upon the question whether the travel was neces-
sitated by the "exigencies of the business". See note 7 in Williams
v. Patterson, supra n. 85. See also 4 Mertens, Law of Federal
Income Taxation section 25.93 (1960).
87 In Williams v. Patterson, supra n. 85 the court had this to say:
"Second, we note particularly that there is no language in the
statute limiting its application to "expenses incurred while . . .
away from home overnight". The "overnight" gloss was dreamed
up by the Department. Third, there is nothing in the statute in-
dicating any Congressional intent that "away from home" means
either overnight or away from home for a period substantially
longer than an ordinary working day ..... " (All italicized in
original; footnotes omitted). For the contra view of the Com-
missioner see Rev. Rul. 495, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 75 and I.R.S. Pub-
lication No. 300, 5 CCH 1956 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. paragraph
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In Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc.s s all the costs of an Afri-
can safari taken by the principal officer and his wife were
allowed as an advertising expense deduction. The publicity
attending the trip, the films that were made and exhibited,
the display of animals captured or killed, the newspaper
reports of the trip, and animal naming contest of one of the
captured animals, were found to be of such great advertis-
ing value that the court held the expenditures to be ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses. What a wonderful
way to take a $16000 tax-free trip! Surprisingly enough
the Commissioner acquiesced to this decision. However,
Sheldon, president of the National Association of Insur-
ance Agents, was not as fortunate. His duties required him
to attend meetings and conventions in various parts of the
country. His wife accompanied him and assisted him in
carrying out his duties by being a partner at dances and
receptions and acting as hostess for the wives of other
members. It was held that her traveling expenses were of
a personal nature.91 But in AZlenberg Cotton Company,
InC.92 the cost of travel, meals, and lodging of the wife of
the president of the taxpayer corporation on world-wide
business trips was held deductible by the corporation and
not includible in his income because the diabetic husband
required a travel companion and in the doctor's opinion his
wife was the person best able to care for him.9 3
Hundreds of illustrations could be cited to show the
widespread practice of luxury spending claimed as busi-
ness deductions. It reached the point that the President of
6347. See also Rev. Rul. 221, 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 34 in which the
Commissioner states that it will follow the Williams decision in
similar railroad conductor cases.
88 25 T.C. 463 (1955).
89 Rev. Rul. 583, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 117.
90 Sheldon v. Commissioner, 290 F.2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
91 Similar holding in Patterson v. Thomas, 289 F.2d 108 (5th Cir.
1961).
92 - F. Supp-(D.C. Tenn. 1960).
93 See also Faitoute Iron & Steel Co., 11 B.T.A. 818 (1928) in which
the amount by which a corporation reimbursed its president for
his and his wife's expenses while on a business trip to South
America was deductible by the corporation. No showing was
made that the wife's presence was required at all.
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the United States expressed his concern in his message to
Congress:
In recent years widespread abuses have developed
through the use of the expense account. Too many
firms and individuals have devised means of deducting
too many personal living expenses as business expenses,
thereby charging a large part of their cost to the Fed-
eral Government. Indeed, expense account living has
become a byword in the American scene.
This is a matter of national concern, affecting not only
our public revenues, our sense of fairness, and our re-
spect for the tax system, but our moral and business
practices as well. This widespread distortion of our
,business and social structure is largely a creature of the
tax system, and the time has come when our tax laws
should cease their encouragement of luxury spending
as a charge on the Federal Treasury. The slogan-"it's
deductible"-should pass from our scene. 4
Congress reacted by passing section 274.95 Its objective is
to tighten the deduction requirements. The tests of section
162 (ordinary and necessary) are retained and are to be
met before section 274 becomes operative. But a host of
new tests and new terminology is introduced. "Activity"
is distinguished from "facility", "directly related to" and
"associated with" qualifying the former term and "used
primarily for the furtherance of taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness" refers to the latter. "Business meals" must be served
in surroundings "of a type generally considered to be
conducive to a business discussion". The Section and the
Regulations 06 pertaining thereto express in great detail
the new requirements and the exceptions thereto. The com-
mittee reports 97 are very specific also, and make it clear
94 The President's Message on the Federal Tax System, H.R. Doe.
No. 140, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) as reprinted in 1 United
States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 1136 (1961).
95 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
96 Treas. Reg. section 1.274-1 through -8 (1960).
97 S. Rep. No. 181, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1.962); H.R. Rep. No.
1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); H.R. Rep. No. 2508, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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that the Cohan 98 rule is abolished as is the deductibility of
the Sanitary Farms 99 type of expenditure. Unfortunately
the very specificity of the terminology will give rise to liti-
gation for years to come until their meaning shall have
been judicially and administratively settled. N6r does the
new section eliminate the enjoyment of tax free income, it
merely prevents flagrant abuses. Thus the cost of facilities
maintained on the company premises to furnish food and
beverage to employees and executives continues to be de-
ductible to the company and non taxable to the recip-
ients.100 Recreational facilities, such as company theatres,
swimming pools, golf courses, athletic fields, picnics, danc-
es, Christmas parties, art clubs, photography clubs, are ex-
cepted from the over 50% rule of section 274, if the facili-
ty is for the benefit of employees other than officers, high-
ly compensated employees or ten percent shareholders. 011
A company owning yachts or hunting lodges has not neces-
sarily lost all deductibility of upkeep costs. If under the
ordinary and reasonable tests more than 50% of its use
was for business entertaining, then the proportion of cost
applicable to use directly related to business activity is de-
ductible. If less than half of the entertainment expense is
attributable to business entertainment then no deduction
whatsoever is permitted, even as to directly related enter-
tainment.102 Club dues and fees "shall be treated as items
with respect to facilities". 10 3 Therefore if the taxpayer es-
tablishes that more than 50% of his use of the club is busi-
ness use under section 162, then all expenses directly re-
lated to business use will continue to be deductible. Dues
98 Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
99 Supra n. 88.
100 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 274(e) (2).
101 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 274 (e) (5). In Slaymaker Lock
Company, 18T.C. 1001 (1952) the company experienced difficulty
in retaining foremen because of higher salaries offered by com-
peting companies. To alleviate this condition it built a $36,000
facility and conveyed title to it to its foremen's association to be
used by its members. The full cost was allowed as a deduction
in the year of transfer. Under section 274 it could retain title
and still obtain an annual deduction equivalent to depreciation
and maintenance including all expenses connected therewith.
102 S. Rep. No. 1-881, 87th ;Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) as reported in
1062-3 Cum. Bull. 787.
103 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 274 (a) (2) (A).
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paid to civic clubs such as Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary, Civitan,
or clubs used solely for business lunches, or professional
and trade association clubs are exempt from the rules of
section 274.
The "entertainment associated with trade or business"
rule refers to situations where substantial business discus-
sions directly preceded or followed the entertainment ac-
tivity. The Finance Committee explained it as follows:
When the taxpayer conducts lengthy negotiations with
a group of business associates and that evening the
group goes to a night club, theater or sporting event for
relaxation, such entertainment expenses are regarded as
directly related to the active conduct of business. More-
over, if a group of business associates with whom the
taxpayer is conducting business meetings comes from
out of town to the taxpayer's place of business to hold
substantial business discussions, the entertainment of
such business guests prior to the business discussions
also is directly related to the conduct of the business.
Similarly, if in between business meetings at a conven-
tion the taxpayer entertains his business associates at-
tending such meetings, such expenses will be allow-
able.1 0 4
Abuses in deduction of traveling expenses, 0 5 including
meals and lodging, have been sought to be remedied
through section 274(c). If the travel lasts longer than
one week and more than 25% of the time of the trip was
spent in pursuit of personal gratification, an allocation of
the expenses is required. Thus, where taxpayer flew from
New York to London for a two day business transaction
and then flew to Stockholm for a fourteen day vacation and
then back to New York, the trip lasting eighteen days,
14/18 of the cost attributable to transportation to and from
London is disallowed. The cost of food and lodging for
the two days in London is allowable. In another example,
104 S. Rep. No. 181, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) as reported in
1962-3 Cum. Bull. 735.
105 Vacation trips -being charged off as business trips.
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taxpayer flew from New York to Brussels where he spent
fourteen days on business and five days on personal mat-
ters and then returned to New York, the entire trip lasting
21 days. The taxpayer is allowed the total cost attributable
to transportation to and from Brussels and the food and
lodging for fourteen days, but not the food and lodging for
the five days spent on personal matters. Although the trip
exceeded a week, the time spent on non-business activities
(5/21) was less than 25% of the time of the total trip.1° 6
No allocation of transportation expenses is required if the
trip lasts less than a week. 0 7 Although flagrant abuses
will not be possible under these rules, it is obvious that one
can still obtain vacation trips in which the cost of trans-
portation will be tax free consumption.
Accident and Health Plans
As can be gathered from the discussion on travel and
entertainment expenses, expenditures by an employer for
the personal expenses of an employee are taxable income to
the employee. 08 However, an exception to this rule is made
in sections 105 and 106.109 Moreover, this exception extends
not only to the employee but his wife and dependents as
well. These sections provide that the cost of the following
employer financed health and accident plans are not in-
cludible in the employee's income: 110
(a) Accident and health plans to compensate the
employee for personal injury or sickness incurred by
him, his wife or his dependents
(b) Medical care reimbursement plans for medical
expenses incurred by the employee, his wife, and his
dependents
(c) Plans to pay for permanent loss of, or loss of
use of, a member or function of the body or the perma-
106 Supra n. 104 at 876.
107 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 274(c).
108 And see Treas. Reg. section 1.61-2 (d) (2) (1957).
109 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
110 And under section 162 is deductible by the'employer.
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nent disfigurement of the employee, his wife or his de-
pendents. The payments are to be computed in relation-
ship to the nature of the injury, not absence from work
(d) Wage continuation payment plans during ill-
ness, popularly referred to as "sick pay".
Another unique feature of this exception is that it can be
highly discriminatory and limited to highly paid execu-
tives."'i
Not only is the cost of these insurance programs or non-
insured plans non-taxable to the employees, but proceeds of
these benefits are not taxable to him if the payments are
received for the following:
(a) To reimburse him for expenditures for medi-
cal " 2 care of himself, his wife, or his dependents
(b) Amounts paid to him, his wife, or his depend-
ents for the permanent loss of a member or function of
the body or for permanent disfigurement
(c) To the extent of $100 a week, amounts paid as
"sick pay".
Benefits obtained under circumstances other than the three
above are taxable income to the employee." 3
Group Life Insurance
Another exception to the rule that payments by an em-
ployer for the personal expenses of an employee is taxable
Ill Treas. Reg. section 1.105-5(1956) states: ". . .A plan may cover
one or more employees, and there may be different plans for dif-
ferent employees or classes of employees." Normally discrimina-
tory employee-benefit plans do not qualify for tax deduction.
312 The expenses which may be reimbursed tax free are quite diverse.
They include any type of expense which would qualify as a de-
ductible medical expense under section 213 (see Int. Rev. Code
of 1954 section 105(b) and 213(e) ). Therefore dental reim-
bursement plans are permissible.
113 But under employee financed plans no proceeds of any kind are
taxable. Under employer-employee financed plans the portion
attributable to the employer's portion of the premiums is taxable.
Where the premiums paid by the employer are included in the
employee's income, all types of proceeds are tax free.
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income to employee is the non-taxability of premiums paid
by an employer on group term life insurance covering the
employees. This exception arose not through statutory en-
actment (as did the health and accident plan exception) but
through administrative rulings. A 1920 law opinion 114
ruled that group term life insurance premiums paid by the
employer is not income to the employee. Moreover, no anti-
discrimination provisions were made in the various rulings
issued,11 5 and thus higher coverage (i.e., higher multiples
of annual compensation) may be given to executives and
officers than is afforded to lower paid employees. In this
connection it might be noted that some states have statutes
limiting the maximum amount of group insurance which
may be written per person, usually in terms of a ratio of
insurance to the salary of the employee covered. Pennsyl-
vania permits maximum coverage per person of $20,000 or
one and one-half times the employee's salary to a maximum
of $40,000 whichever is greater."16 This situation could be
avoided by having the policies issued to and held by an out
of state trustee.1 7 But in such a situation the non-taxabili-
ty feature of the premium payments might be lost since the
rulings seem to indicate that this feature is limited to plans
involving direct payments by the employer, and the impo-
sition of a trust entity 'between the employer and employee
might change the situation."" Furthermore, in a letter rul-
ing"n9 the Commissioner indicated that highly discrimina-
tory plans will not qualify for tax-free status.
114 L.O. 1014, 2 Gum. Bull. 88 (1920). The reasoning behind this
ruling is very interesting: "The financial benefits under these
policies do not move to the employees personally, but only to their
heirs or dependents after their deaths .... The employee has no
,ption to take the amount of premiums paid ... instead of the
insurance. The policy has no paid up value .... The premium
paid therefor is in no sense "gain derived" or realized ... in dol-
lars and cents, but only in the feeling of contentment that provi-
sion has been made for dependents. It is paid by the employer
not as compensation to the employee, but as an investment in in-
creased'efficiency." (Emphasis added).
"15 -See for e.g. G.C . 16069, XV-1 Cum. Bull. 84 (1936).
116 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, section 532.2 (1954).
117 Wost statutes limit only policies issued within the state.
118 Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 16; Rev. Rul. 52, 1954-1 Cui. Bull.
150; Rev. Rul. 634, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 291.
119 To Century Planning Corporation, P-H 1962 Fed. Tax Serv.
paragraph 54857. The plan proposed insurance of $100,000 on
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No tax exemption is applied to premiums paid for group
permanent policies where the employee receives increasing
values of paid-up life insurance except under special cir-
cumstances.120 There is a method however whereby perma-
nent life insurance can be obtained with at least a partial
tax benefit. It is the split dollar plan, under which the
premiums are divided between the employer and the em-
ployee, the employer paying the premium which is equal to
the increase in cash value each year. The employer owns
the portion equal to the cash surrender value and the em-
ployee the balance. The Commissioner ruled 121 that such
premium payments are merely interest free loans and there-
fore do not result in taxable income to the employee. This
reasoning is somewhat less surprising, especially in light of
other rulings in respect to life insurance benefits. No ad-
ministrative difficulty would arise in trying to determine
the value of the benefit conferred since the employee's sav-
ing could be measured by comparison with rates of term
insurance. Furthermore, under section 101 (a), (2) (B) 122
life insurance policies can be transferred between a corpora-
tion and a stockholder executive without adverse income
tax effects on the proceeds, and thus such an employee could
obtain the policy upon retirement and his beneficiary would
obtain all the proceeds tax free.
Miscellaneous Items
There are hosts of other fringe benefits which afford
tax free income to various classes of taxpayers. Restricted
stock options, pension, profit sharing and other qualified
plans, although the most popular and extensive of fringe
benefits, are beyond the scope of this discussion, since the
each of two shareholder-executives and only $2,000-$3,000 on all
other employees. Said the ruling, referring -to L.O. 1014 (supra
n. 114): "The payment by you of premiums on group term life
insurance, insofar as the premiums are for insurance on the lives
of your two stockholders, cannot be said to be likely to bring about
a feeling of contentment to your employees who own none of your
stock."
120 See Mim. 6477, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 16; Rev. Rul. 165, 1954-1 Cum.
Bull. 17; Rev. Rul. 193, 1955-1 Gum. Bull. 266.
121 Rev. RuL 713, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 23.
122 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
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complexities and ramifications of these devices would mere-
ly tend to blur whatever points may emerge. A brief gen-
eral statement will have to suffice. As regards profit shar-
ing and pension plans, the statutory requirements 2 3
against discrimination (in favor of executives) are strict.
But the benefits gained make it worthwhile to observe them
so that the plan become "qualified". The benefits are:
(1) The employee is not taxed on the employer's
contributions to the fund.124
(2) The employer receives a current deduction for
the amounts contributed to the plan.125
(3) The earnings of the trust are exempt from in-
come tax.
2 6
(4) If the employee receives the accumulated funds
in one taxable year on account of termination of service,
he obtains capital gains treatment rather than ordinary
income.' 27
(5) If the employee dies, a lump sum distribution
of $5000 will be tax exempt. 28
(6) If the employee dies while a participant in a
qualified plan, the value of his interest attributable to
the employer's contribution and payable to a beneficiary
will be exempt from estate tax.129
Another means devised by employers to retain key execu-
tives is the stock option method of compensation. In order
to defer income taxation of these options the requirements
123 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 4D1 and regulations thereto.
124 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sections 402 and 403.
125 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 404.
126 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 501.
127 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, sections 402 (a) (2) and 403 (a) (2).
128 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 101 (b) (2) (A).
129 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 2039 (c).
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of section 521 130 must be observed. The tax result of such
"restricted options" is that the optionee will, under certain
circumstances, obtain favorable capital gains treatment
upon the sale of the stock thus acquired, or under other cir-
cumstances, limited taxable income at the time of exercise
of the option and capital gains rates at the time of sale of
such stock.
Other tax-free items of income that might be mentioned
under this heading are:
(1) Rental value of a home furnished to a minister,
or a rental allowance included in his compensation in
lieu of a parsonage, 131 and an allowance included in his
compensation for utilities. 132
(2) The value of the improvements made by a les-
see is excluded from the gross income of the lessor ac-
quired by the latter upon the termination of the lease. 133
Conclusion
As pointed out in the opening remarks, if individual in-
come taxation is to be equitable, it should be imposed with
reference to total net income from all the various sources
obtained, because the economic status of taxpayers is best
measured by their total net income. Especially is this so
if a consistent system of progressive rates, exemptions,
credits and deductions is to be followed. 134 A reading of
section 61 135 gives the impression that Congress in one
broad sweep accomplished this goal. Too, under such an
encompassing basis the administrative problems of collect-
ing the tax would be simple and conducive to efficient ex-
ecution. Professor Groves' objectives of fair taxation, di-
130 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
131 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 107.
132 Rev. Rul. 350, 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 45.
133 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 109.
134 BUH' ER, PUBLIC FINANCE 495 (3d ed. 1948).
135 hint. Rev. Code of 1954: "...gross income means all income -from
whatever source derived..
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rect taxation, widely shared 13 6 taxation would also be easily
accomplished. But these purposes are frustrated by sec-
tions 101 through 119 's' listing items excludible from gross
income; and sections 162, 212, and 274 138 mnay lead to unin-
tended exclusions. 139 Does the "convenience of the employ-
er" make the free meals and lodging furnished to the em-
ployee anyless beneficial income than if he were to pay a
higher salary from which the employee would have to pur-
chase these necessities? In fact, does the employee not ac-
cept a lower salary knowing that he is to receive the free
meals and lodgings? Or is there logic in not taxing the value
of the meal if eaten on the premises of the employer, but
taxing the reimbursement therefor if eaten across the
street (in an arrangement whereby the employee had to
eat there so that he would be available to his employer dur-
ing the meal time) ? And even in situations where the job
site is in a remote place, are not the meals and lodging con-
sumption by the recipient although it may be necessary
or expedient for the employer to provide them? Admitted-
ly, placing a valuation on meals and lodging furnished
would be a monstrous task, if each situation were to be de-
termined separately. But standards of measure could be pre-
scribed based on another standard. For example, the sal-
ary of the employee could be the basis of the valuation.
Tables could be published by the Internal Revenue Service
placing valuations on meals and lodgings on the same wage
and salary ranges as it now publishes for withholding -tax
purposes. Employers could then compute the total salary
they are in effect paying, and w'ithhold -the taxes accord-
ingly. By this means the lessening of the progressivity of
the tax rates is eliminated 140 (as pertains to this portion of
136 GROVIES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOMIC PROG-
RESS, 873 (1946).
137 Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
138 Ibid.
139 This paper does not extend to the myriad other preferences such
as capital gains, depletion, gifts, social security, tax exempt in-
terest, etc., etc.
140 An executive whose marginal tax rate is 50% receives a $250
tax advantage if he consumes (in a year's period) $500 worth
of food in an employer furnished dining room, whereas an em-
ployee in the 25% tax bracket obtains only a $125 tax advantage
for the same quantity of consumption.
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tax free income) as is the discriminatory treatment relative
to taxpayers who are not fortunate enough to be fed and
sheltered by their employers.
Not even the "convenience of the employer" justifica-
tion could be applied in defense of tax free group term life
insurance and health and accident plans. The social ad-
vantages and benefits of those plans are undisputed, but
no one has ever satisfactorily explained why an employee
who is relieved of using after-tax dollars to provide such
protection is not held to have realized taxable income.
Moreover, these plans are permitted to be discriminatory
in favor of the highly paid executive-stockholder, and gross-
ly discriminatory against self employed proprietors or part-
ners who cannot obtain them on a tax free basis.
The cost of traveling expenses are as much a cost of
doing business as the cost of raw materials, labor, or any
other factor of production, and therefore any suggestion
that they be disallowed would be ridiculous. But entertain-
ment stands on other ground. Business is business. It
should be conducted in the business office. Any entertain-
ment is personal in nature. The very concept of the two ac-
tivities are in juxtaposition. How can entertainment be
directly related to or associated with business? The very
purpose of entertainment is to bring about relaxation and
personal gratification. It is the tax laws themselves (by
allowing deductions therefor) that brought about the idea
that entertainment of prospective customers is a business
activity. It is the tax laws that sanctioned entertainment
expenses with a false aura of legitimacy.
Neither is there justification for the capital gain fea-
tures afforded to certain transactions resulting from stock
options, stock bonus plans, pension plans and other quali-
fied plans. Employers bestow these benefits upon their re-
cipients as a form of compensation and therefore should be
taxed as any other compensation.
Aside from the questions of equity and fairness regard-
ing all the aforementioned exclusions and deductions and
[VOTL. 5:46
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tax advantages, the administrative problems created by
them are tragic. The sheer waste of human effort put into
litigation of thousands of cases in which the issues were
whether it was or was not for the convenience of the em-
ployer, whether it was or was not an ordinary and neces-
sary expenditure, whether it was or was not a personal ex-
pense, is appalling. The abuses 141 to which this portion of
the tax law led can only be characterized as shameful.
It is hereby suggested that the tax free nature of meals
and lodging, health and accident plans, group term insur-
ance, and the deductibility of entertainment expenses, and
the capital gains feature of the various executive compen-
sation plans, and the preferential tax treatment of all those
various items not within the scope of this paper, be abolish-
ed. A revision of the tax law along these lines would broad-
en the tax base to such an extent that the very high tax
rates could be eliminated, which in itself would reduce the
incentive to devise schemes of avoidance by using the "loop-
holes" afforded by these provisions. It would eliminate the
vast administrative problems of enforcement posed under
the present conditions. Litigation would be reduced to a
fraction of what it is now. And most importantly it would
achieve a most fundamental requisite of taxation: There
would be equal taxation of persons with equal incomes.
141 Repealed section 120 of the Code is a classic example of taxpayer
eagerness for evasion. This section provided for exclusion of
statutory subsistence allowance to law enforcement officers. Sud-
denly states and municipalities rewrote their compensation laws
to include in the salary of all such officers a per diem subsis-
tence allowance, whether such allowance was in fact warranted
or not.
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